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Abstract—We study multi-hop data-dissemination in a wireless
network from one source to multiple nodes where some of the
nodes of the network act as re-transmitting nodes and help the
source in data dissemination. In this network, we study two
scenarios; i) the transmitting nodes do not need an incentive and
ii) they do need an incentive and are paid by their corresponding
receiving nodes by virtual tokens. We investigate two problems;
P1) network power minimization for the first scenario and P2)
social cost minimization for the second scenario, defined as the
total cost paid by the nodes of the network for receiving data. In
this paper, we propose centralized and decentralized approaches
for each of the problems. The proposed decentralized approach
is based on a non-cooperative cost-sharing game (CSG). In our
proposed game, every receiving node chooses its respective trans-
mitting nodes and consequently, a cost is assigned to it according
to the power imposed on its chosen transmitting nodes. For the
sake of energy efficiency, in our model, we employ maximal-ratio
combining (MRC) at the receivers so that a receiver can be served
by multiple transmitters. Moreover, besides the radio-link power,
we capture the power required by the passive modules of wireless
devices involved in reception/transmission. We discuss how the
network is formed in a decentralized way, find the actions of the
nodes in the game and show that the proposed game reaches
a Nash equilibrium. To find the centralized global optimum,
which is a benchmark to our decentralized approach, we use a
mixed-integer-liner-program (MILP). The proposed MILP can
be used for both of the problems P1 and P2 with a minor
change. Simulation results show that our proposed decentralized
approach outperforms the conventional algorithms in terms of
energy efficiency and social cost while it can address the need
for an incentive for collaboration.1
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growing integration of communication networks,
the Internet of things (IoT) and sensor networks under the
umbrella of 5G, there is a need for increasing the capacity of
future dense wireless networks [2]. Multi-hop communications
is an efficient technique that can increase the capacity of wire-
less networks and improve the reliability of communications.
This paper specifically studies multi-hop broadcast where
one source disseminates its data to multiple receivers. The data
here could be a file, a software update, a video stream, etc.
In this multi-hop network, in order to decrease the transmit
power required at the source for serving all the receiving
nodes or to increase the coverage area, some of the nodes
may need to re-transmit the source’s data. We investigate two
scenarios in this network. In the first scenario, we assume
1Part of this paper has been published in [1].
that the re-transmitting nodes are willing to collaborate with
the source in data dissemination. Such a scenario may apply
to IoT and sensor networks. In the first scenario, the objective
is to minimize the power required in the network for data
dissemination. In the second scenario, however, we assume
that the transmitting nodes require an incentive from their
corresponding receiving nodes in exchange for transmitting
the data to them. Such an assumption is vital for situations in
which human users play an active role in data dissemination.
Hence, in the second scenario, we aim at minimizing the social
cost, defined as the summation of the costs that the nodes pay
in exchange for receiving the source’s data [3]. The payment
in this scenario is via virtual tokens, assumed to be available
at the nodes.
Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, serving
multiple nodes by multicast transmission is more energy-
efficient than employing unicast transmission where every
receiving node requires a separate transmission. Moreover,
since there may exist multiple transmitting nodes in our
network, a receiving node is able to receive multiple copies of
the disseminated message. The receiver in this case, instead of
relying on one transmitter, can combine the received copies in
order to decode the message. This helps in network energy-
efficiency. Further, in a wireless device, two types of modules
are involved in message transmission; passive and active mod-
ules. The passive modules such as digital-to-analog converter,
mixer, etc., require a fix power for proper operation [23]. We
refer to the power required for these modules as the circuitry
power. In contrast, the power required at the active module,
that is, the amplifier, is not fixed and varies depending on the
channel gain between a transmitter and a receiver. This power
is referred to as the radio link power. Despite the fact that the
circuitry power is not negligible compared to the radio link
power [23], it is usually ignored in the literature and merely
the radio link power is considered for optimization.
For the sake of energy-efficiency, in the present work, i)
we consider multicast transmission so that multiple receiving
nodes can be served by a common transmitter, ii) we let every
receiving node be served by multiple transmitting nodes and in
this case, maximal ratio combining (MRC) is used to combine
the copies of the message received at a receiver and iii) besides
the radio link power, we take into account the circuitry power
and show that our model leads to form a network that requires
a lower power for data dissemination compared to the circuitry
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power-agnostic approaches.
In order to design a decentralized mechanism, for both the
first and the second scenarios, we use game theory. A non-
cooperative cost sharing game (CSG) is proposed in which
every receiving node chooses one or more than one node
among the nodes of the network as its respective transmitting
node. In addition, the receiving node determines the transmit
power of each of its chosen transmitting nodes such that
the receiving node receives the message with a required
minimum signal to noise ratio (SNR). As the consequence
of the receiver’s decision, a cost is assigned to it. By using
a CSG, in a multicast transmission where a transmitting node
has multiple receivers, the cost paid to the transmitter is shared
among its receivers by a so-called cost sharing scheme. The
cost in the first scenario is an artificial cost, used as a tool
by which a node merely finds the best transmitting nodes for
itself in order to minimize the network power, whereas, in the
second scenario, the cost of the node determines the cost, i.e.,
the number of tokens, that needs to be paid by the receiver to
each of its chosen transmitters.
In both scenarios, the cost of a receiving node is defined as a
function of the total transmit power of its chosen transmitting
nodes, including the radio link and the circuitry powers. Such
a design is clear to be beneficial for the first scenario as we
aim at network power minimization. The reason for taking
such an approach for the second scenario is the importance
of battery-life for the end-users. Studies show that energy
consumption is one of the main concerns of the users when
it comes to collaborative transmission [4]. Hence, in the
second scenario, the transmitting nodes are also paid by their
respective receiving nodes based on the power they use for
serving their receivers. The fundamental difference in the CSG
proposed for each of the scenarios is the employed cost sharing
scheme. In the first scenario, we use the marginal contribution
(MC) cost sharing scheme as it is suitable for network power
minimization [5]. In the second scenario where every receiver
pays a price in exchange for receiving the message, having
a fair cost allocation is critical, especially when multiple
receiving nodes are served by a common transmitting node
via multicast. In this scenario, we employ the Shapley value
(SV) known as it the fairest cost allocation scheme [3].
Our proposed game is iterative where the nodes take their
action one after another until the convergence of the game to
a point at which none of the nodes can reduce its cost given
the actions of the others, called the Nash equilibrium (NE)
point. The proposed game is shown to be a potential game for
which the existence of at least one NE is guaranteed.
In addition to the decentralized approach, we find the
centralized optimum network configuration by a mixed-integer
linear program (MILP). The optimum centralized solution
serves as the benchmark for our proposed decentralized ap-
proach. The centralized MILP formulation that we provide
can be used for both scenarios by a minor change.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the related work and our main contributions. Section
III describes the network model and formulates the problem.
The proposed decentralized algorithm and details of the game
are explained in Section IV. Section V provides the global
optimum via an MILP. Performance analysis is presented in
Section VI and finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. STATE OF THE ART AND MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
Energy efficiency is one of the main challenges in multi-
hop communications. Broadly speaking, the algorithms for
multi-hop data dissemination are either centralized [6], [7]
or decentralized [8], [9]. One of the well-known centralized
heuristics for minimum-power multi-hop broadcast is proposed
by the authors in [6], called the broadcast incremental power
(BIP) [6]. The BIP is a greedy algorithm, starts from the
source and adds the nodes one by one to the network. Being
centralized is the main drawback of the BIP. The dependency
of the centralized approaches on a central entity makes them
difficult to implement and vulnerable against the failure of
the connection between the nodes and the central entity.
Hence, decentralized approaches are more suitable for such
applications. While numerous centralized algorithms have
been proposed by researchers for minimum-power multi-hop
broadcast, there does not exist much work on decentralized
approaches. Recently, decentralized solutions based on blind
[8] and probabilistic [10] approaches are proposed where in
the former case, the nodes are unaware of the presence of
each other, and in the latter one, the reception of the data is
not guaranteed. Since the transmissions by such approaches
are unreliable, they cannot be used for streaming applications
or payment-dependent transmissions.
The authors of [7] propose a greedy centralized heuristic
that exploits MRC in multi-hop broadcast and we refer to it
as GreedyMRC. Like the BIP, it starts from the source and in
every iteration, it finds the node which is the best transmitter in
the network in terms of the energy required for transmission of
the message to others. Every transmitting node uses a separate
time-slot for transmission and the nodes of the network receive
the message over multiple time-slots and combine them via
MRC until they accumulate the minimum SNR required for
decoding the message. Although GreedyMRC exploits MRC,
it is centralized, does not address the incentive issue and
ignores the circuitry power.
One of the main drawbacks of the existing algorithms for
multi-hop broadcast is that they usually consider the nodes
as passive and ready-to-collaborate entities. In practice, and
more specifically in the future generation of wireless networks,
the human users play an active role in data dissemination,
for instance, by sharing their already-cached video [11] or in
store-carry-forward applications [12]. Thus, having an incen-
tive for users’ contribution is critical. A variety of incentive
mechanisms have been proposed by researchers which rely
either on a tit-for-tat strategy or reputation mechanism [13]
or virtual currency [14]. With the growing popularity of
cryptocurrencies in recent years, the latter strategy, that is,
the use of virtual currency, is attracting significant attention
[13], [15]. For instance, recently, the authors in [13] proposed
a virtual currency to be used for computation offloading in ad-
hoc networks in which the users offload their tasks to other
remote entities. A virtual currency similar to the one proposed
in [13] can be employed in our network, however, in the
present work, our focus is on the network formation rather
than a token or a virtual currency design.
The importance of multi-hop broadcast for future commu-
nication networks implies the need for a more comprehensive
algorithm capable of addressing both the energy efficiency
and incentive issue which, to the best of our knowledge, has
not been addressed in the literature. In [1], [16], we pro-
posed game-theoretic algorithms for minimum-power multi-
hop broadcast. Although [16] considers MRC, the decision
making at the nodes is based on a heuristic iterative approach
which may not necessarily be the best decision for the node.
In [1], we showed that the decision-making problem at the
nodes can be solved optimally by a linear program in contrast
to the heuristic approach of [16].
In the present work, we improve our work in [1], where
a decentralized approach merely for social cost minimization
is proposed. Here, we propose a general framework for data
dissemination which can be employed for social cost or
network power minimization. We will show that in both cases,
the cost function of the nodes can be modeled by a piece-
wise linear function and the decision-making problem at a
node can be solved via an MILP. Moreover, the power model
that we consider for the nodes in the present work includes
the circuitry power for both transmission and reception which
makes the network power model much more realistic. We
also discuss how the nodes can use a shared channel for
transmission and show that the circuitry power needed for
signal reception, in particular, has a significant impact on
the optimization problem. Finally, to complete the work, we
provide an MILP that finds the centralized global optimum
configuration for both scenarios.
Briefly, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• For multi-hop broadcast we study network power min-
imization when the transmitting nodes do not need an
incentive for transmission and social cost minimization
when having an incentive for the transmitting nodes
is mandatory. When an incentive is required, we also
address the fairness in cost allocation.
• Our algorithm supports multicast transmission and fur-
ther, exploits the MRC technique by which the receiving
nodes can be served by multiple nodes, instead of relying
on one transmitting node for data reception.
• Besides the radio link power, our model considers the
circuitry power required for reception and transmission
of a message which is much more realistic compared to
the state-of-the-art.
• We provide an MILP formulation that finds the global
optimum configuration for both scenarios as a benchmark.
III. NETWORK MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
A. Transmission and power models
We consider a network composed of N + 1 wireless nodes
with random locations in a two-dimensional plane; a source
S and a set P of N receiving nodes. The nodes in P are
interested in receiving the source’s message. We denote the
set of all the nodes of the network by Q = P ∪ {S}. Every
node j ∈ Q is equipped with an omnidirectional antenna
and has an amplifier power constraint pmaxj for transmission
over a radio link, and hence, its coverage area is limited. For
the sake of simplicity, we omit the efficiency coefficient of
the amplifier of the transmitters. In a transmission from a
transmitting node j ∈ Q to a receiving node i ∈ P\{j},
nodes j and i are called the parent node (PN) and the child
node (CN), respectively. The PNs transmit either by unicast or
multicast if they have one or more than one intended receivers,
respectively. The transmission flow from the source to other
nodes of the network forms a directed acyclic graph (DAG),
a graph in which there is at least one directed path from the
source to all the nodes without any cycle, see Fig. 1.
Every node i ∈ P chooses its PNs as well as the radio-link
power of each of its chosen PNs. By combining the signals
received from its chosen PNs, a CN can successfully decode
the message if the accumulated SNR is at least equal to a
threshold value γth. The radio link power used by PN j to
serve CN i, requested by the CN, is denoted by preqi,j . We
define the action of a node as the set of tuples composed of
the PNs that the node chooses along with the corresponding
requested powers as
ai =
{
(j, preqi,j )|j ∈ Ai, preqi,j ∈ [0, pmaxj ]
}
, (1)
in which Ai is the action set of the CN i from which it chooses
its PNs. The set of actions of all the nodes is defined as
a := {ai|i ∈ P}. (2)
The SNR received at node i by unicast is defined as
γi,j(p
req
i,j ) =
preqi,j gi,j
σ2
. (3)
in which gi,j and σ2 are the channel gain between nodes
i and j and the noise power, respectively. We assume that
the transmitting nodes in the this network have their own
channel for transmission and intra-network interference can be
neglected [5]. Further, we assume that the statistical properties
of the channel remain unchanged during the data dissemination
and the channel gains of the links between a given node and
its neighboring nodes are known at the node.
The set Ni of the neighboring nodes of node i ∈ P is
defined as the nodes which can provide the minimum SNR
required for decoding the message at node i via unicast
considering their maximum radio-link power. More precisely,
Ni = {j|j ∈ Qi, γi,j(pmaxj ) ≥ γth} (4)
in which γi,j(pmaxj ) is defined in (3). Although with MRC
a CN is able to accumulate the signals transmitted from the
PNs which are not in its neighboring area, we restrict the
action set of a CN to the nodes in its neighboring area. This
is because overhead information needs to be transmitted in
S. . . . . .
. . .
Fig. 1: A sample network. In this network, node i decides to be
served by more than one PN, that is, nodes l and j.
practice between a PN and a CN in order to find the multicast
receiving group, the cost of the CNs, etc., and this implies that
the PN must be in the neighboring area of the CN. The action
set of node i in this section is defined as the set of neighboring
nodes of node i whose distance from the source, in terms of
the number of hops, is not larger than that for node i. More
precisely, it is defined as
Ai = {j|j ∈ Ni, hj ≤ hi, hj 6=∞} (5)
in which hj is called the hop-rank of node j ∈ Q, representing
the number of hops from the source to node j. Denoting by
Wi ⊆ Ai,Wi 6= ∅ the set of PNs of CN i, the hop-rank of
CN i is obtained by
hi = max
j∈Wi
{hj}+ 1, ∀i ∈ P, (6)
which indicates that the hop-rank of a node depends on the
maximum of the hop-ranks of its PNs. Initially, we set hS = 0
and hi =∞ for all i ∈ P . Based on the definition of the action
of a node in (1), we observe that each action contains two sub-
actions. We call them the PN set and the power request set of
node i and define them as
Wi =
{
j|preqi,j > 0, j ∈ Ai
}
(7)
and
preqi =
{
preqi,j |preqi,j > 0, j ∈ Ai
}
, (8)
respectively. The number of PNs chosen by CN i is denoted
by Wi = |Wi| and Wmax is the maximum number of allowed
PNs. In Fig. 1, Wi = {l, j}. From the perspective of a
transmitting node j ∈ Q, we define the set of its CNs as
Mj =
{
i
preqi,j > 0,∀i ∈ Nj} . (9)
We also denote the set of radio-link power requests re-
ceived by node j from its neighboring nodes as prcvj ={
preqi,j |i ∈Mj
}
and prcv−i,j := p
rcv
j \
{
preqi,j
}
represents prcvj
without preqi,j . The radio-link power of PN j in a multicast
transmission is given by
pTxj (p
rcv
j ) = max
i∈Mj
{
preqi,j
}
. (10)
As mentioned in Sec. I, the hardware of a wireless trans-
mitter consists of several passive modules which all require
a power for proper operation. We refer to this power as the
circuitry power of a node and denote the circuitry power of
a node for transmission and reception by pctj and p
cr
j for all
j ∈ Q, respectively. The circuitry power of a transmitter can
be assumed as a fixed value. Hence, the sum transmit power
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Fig. 2: Transmission and reception in different time-slots in the
scheduled section of the channel access.
of a PN j is obtained by
PTxj (a) := P
Tx
j (p
rcv
j ) = 1j(Mj)
(
pctj + max
i∈Mj
{
preqi,j
})
,
(11)
in which 1j(Mj) indicates if node j acts as a transmitting
node, i.e., 1j(Mj) = 1 if Mj 6= ∅ and 1j(Mj) = 0,
otherwise. Using MRC, the aggregated SNR experienced by
CN i is calculated by
γi|MRC(p
req
i ) :=
∑
j∈Wi
preqi,j gi,j
σ2
. (12)
The channel access scheme employed in this network is
composed of two sections. The first section is a random-access
channel (RACH) used by the nodes for sending requests to
their chosen PNs and the second section is a scheduled section
in which every PN has its own time-slot for transmission.
In MRC-based multi-hop broadcast, when a CN chooses
multiple PNs, each of the selected PNs, if not having a CN
already, needs to reserve a time-slot for its transmission in
the scheduled section. Moreover, each PN needs to inform its
neighboring nodes about the new CN that joined it.
Since in MRC a node needs to receive the messages from
its PNs in multiple time-slots, depending on the number of
PNs that a CN chooses, the reception power and consequently
the energy it requires to consume over multiple time-slots
changes. This issue is further illustrated in Fig. 2 that shows
transmissions over the scheduled section of the channel access.
In this Figure, for instance, node 1 receives its message
from the source in time-slot 1 and acts as a PN in the
next time-slot. Node 2 , in order to receive the message,
accumulates the signals transmitted by nodes 1 and 3 in
time-slots 2 and 3 , respectively. In this example, nodes 2
and 4 receive the message in two time-slots and the circuitry
power they require for message reception is more than that
required by nodes 1 and 3 that use only one time-slot.
The reception power of a CN i is calculated by
PRxi (a) = Wip
cr
i . (13)
Hence, the total power of node j for both message transmis-
sion and reception is given by
P totj (a) = P
Rx
j (a) + P
Tx
j (a) (14)
B. Problem formulation
Since the transmission time-slots have equal length, by
omitting the duration of the time-slots, the energy consumption
of a node for transmission/reception can be represented by the
power required for transmission/reception. Before defining the
problems formally, we define the following terms.
Definition 1: (Network power): The network power is
defined as the sum of the total power of the nodes as
P totnet (a) :=
∑
j∈Q
P totj (a), (15)
in which P totj (a) is defined in (14). We further define the
network transmit power by PTxnet (a) =
∑
j∈Q P
Tx
j (a).
Definition 2: (Node’s Cost): We define by Ci(preqi ) the
total cost that a node i pays to its chosen PNs as
Cfi (a) =
∑
j∈Wi
cfj,i(a), (16)
in which cfj,i(p
req
i,j ) is the cost paid from node i to its PN j
under the cost sharing scheme f .
Definition 3: (Social cost): The social cost of a network
formed by the nodes in P is defined as [3]
SC (a) :=
∑
i∈P
Cfi (a), (17)
in which Ci(a) is defined in (16).
Definition 4: (Budget-balanced cost sharing scheme): A
cost sharing scheme f is budget balanced if∑
i∈Mj
cfj,i(a) = P
Tx
j (a). (18)
In other words, a cost sharing scheme is budget-balanced if
the summation of the costs assigned to the CNs of a PN is
equal to the sum transmit power of the PN.
As discussed earlier, we consider two different scenarios in
this network with the following objectives.
Scenario 1 (Energy minimization) The objective in this
scenario is formally defined as
P1: minimize
{ai}i∈P
P totnet
({ai}i∈P) (19a)
subject to: γi|MRC(p
req
i ) ≥ γth (19b)
i ∈ P, j ∈ Ai. (19c)
According to the definition of Ai in (5) and based on the
definition of hi in (6), it is straightforward to see that having
the condition j ∈ Ai in (19c) is enough to ensure that the
outcome of P1 is a DAG.
Scenario 2 (Social cost minimization) In this scenario,
we aim to find the minimum cost required to be paid by the
receiving nodes of the network for obtaining the message. In
this scenario, we focus on the class of budget-balanced cost
sharing schemes, cf. Definition 4. The network objective for
the second scenario is defined as:
P2: minimize
{ai}i∈P
SC
({ai}i∈P) (20a)
subject to: (18), (19b), (19c). (20b)
Table I lists key notations used in this paper. In the next
section, we propose decentralized approaches for problems P1
and P2.
TABLE I: Key notations used in this paper.
Notation Definition
pctj , p
cr
j Circuitry power of node j for transmission, reception.
pTxj Radio-link power of node j
PTxj Sum transmit power of node j: p
ct
j + p
Tx
j
PRxj Reception power of node j: Wjp
cr
j
P totj Total power of node j : P
Rx
j + P
Tx
j
PTxnet Network transmit power:
∑
j∈Q P
Tx
j
P totnet Network power:
∑
j∈Q P
tot
j
IV. MRC-BASED DECENTRALIZED MULTI-HOP
BROADCAST
A. Game-theoretic model
We design our decentralized approach via a non-cooperative
CSG with the following properties:
• Players: The finite number of nodes in P .
• Action: Defined in (1) as a set of tuples that determines
the PN set and (radio-link) power request set of the node,
defied in (7) and (8), respectively. For the PN set of CN
i we have Wi ∈ 2Ai\{∅} and the joint PN set of the
game is given by W =×i∈PWi, in which 2Ai and×
represent the power-set of Ai and the Cartesian product,
respectively. We further define the joint request set of the
game as Preq =×i∈P preqi .
• Cost function: Assigns a real-valued cost to every node
i ∈ P as Ci(a) : (W,Preq)→ R+. The cost function is
defined in (16).
Remark 1: We employ the MC cost sharing scheme for the
first scenario. We showed in [5] that the MC is simple and
performs fairly well for network power minimization in multi-
hop broadcast.
Definition 5: (Marginal contribution (MC)) The cost of
node i, based on the MC, is defined as the power imposed by
CN i on the network, including the sum transmit power of the
chosen PNs and its own circuitry power, as
CMCi (a) = P
Rx
i (a) +
∑
j∈Wi
cMCj,i (p
rcv
j ) (21)
= Wip
cr
i +
∑
j∈Wi
PTxj (p
rcv
j )− PTxj (prcv−i,j).
with PTxj (p
rcv
j ) defined in (11).
Remark 2: In the second scenario where the CNs need to
pay a price for receiving data, there are two points that have to
be considered in defining a cost sharing function. Firstly, the
cost sharing function must be budget-balanced. With a budget-
balanced scheme, as shown in (18), a PN is paid by its CNs
according to its sum transmit power. Secondly, the cost sharing
function must be fair. Given a multicast by a PN, according
to (10), each CN imposes a different level of radio-link power
on the PN and thus, the cost that they need to pay to the PN
must be shared among them in a fair manner. For this scenario,
we employ Shapley value (SV) which is budget-balanced and
known as the fairest cost sharing scheme [3].
Definition 6: (Shapley value (SV)) The SV of CN i ∈Mj
is defined by [17]
cSVj,i (a) =
∑
S⊆Mj\{i}
|S|! (|Mj | − |S| − 1)!
|Mj |! (P
Tx
j (S∪{i})−PTxj (S)).
(22)
Remark 3: While the cost function of a node in the first
scenario, defined in (21), contains the reception power of a
CN, the one used for the second scenario is merely defined
according to the sum transmit powers of the PNs. The reason
is that the goal in the first scenario is to minimize the network
power and as far as the power of the network as a whole
is concerned, the reception power needs to be also included
in the cost function of the node. In contrast, in the second
scenario we aim at minimizing the paid cost. In this case, we
assume that a CN is not concerned about its reception power
and merely aims at minimizing the cost it pays to its PNs.
Definition 7: (Exact potential game) A game G is an exact
potential game [18] if there exists a function Φ : (W,Preq)→
R, called the potential function, such that ∀i ∈ P , a,a′ ∈
(W,Preq)
Ci(a
′)− Ci(a) = Φ(a′)− Φ(a). (23)
Lemma 1: The game G without employing MRC, where
every node is allowed to choose only one PN, is a potential
game for which at least one pure NE exists [5]. The NE is
reachable by using best response dynamics in which every
node iteratively chooses its PNs in a way to minimize its cost
given the decision of other nodes.
Theorem 1: The game G with MRC possesses an NE.
Proof: Using Lemma 1 and the definition of an exact
potential game in Definition 7, we show that our proposed
game is also an an exact potential game. Let ∆i
(j)
ci and ∆i
(j)
Φ
denote the change in the cost of node i and the potential
function when i changes its request from PN j. Being a
potential game in case of having only one PN implies that
∆i
(j)
ci = ∆
i
(j)
Φ. Let Wi and W ′i be the sets of old and new PNs
of CN i and ∆i
Wi→W′i
Ci be the change in the cost of node i
when it changes its PNs from Wi to W ′i . According to (16),
the change in the cost of node i can be written as
∆i
Wi→W′i
Ci = ∆
i
Wi→W′i
∑
j∈Wi∪W′i
cj,i (24)
Since the cost function in G, defined in (16), is linearly
separable with respect to the cost paid by a CN to each of
its chosen PNs, we can write the right side of (24) as
∆i
Wi→W′i
∑
j∈Wi∪W′i
cj,i =
∑
j∈Wi∪W′i
∆i
(j)
ci =
∑
j∈Wi∪W′i
∆i
(j)
Φ
= ∆i
(j)
∑
j∈Wi∪W′i
Φ = ∆Φ′, (25)
which shows that the game is still an exact potential game.
Hence, at least one NE exists for the game which can be
obtained using the best response dynamics.
B. Scenario 1: Minimum-power data dissemination
In this section, we propose an MILP for the problem in
(19a) using the MC, aiming at network power minimization.
According to (21), cMCj,i (a) can be broken down as (26).
As can be seen from (26), when 1j(Mj{i}) = 1, the cost
function cMCj,i (a) is a piece-wise linear function. Given the
piece-wise linearity of the cost function, we propose the MILP
problem shown in (27) for decision making at every node
i ∈ P . In the MILP, given in (27), wi is a binary vector of
length |Ai| defined as wi = [wi,j |j ∈ Ai] where wi,j = 1 if
node i chooses node j ∈ Aj as its PN.
We define ti,j as an auxiliary variable which is used in both
(27a) and (27d). wi,jpcri in (27a) represents the power imposed
on the network by node i due to its signal reception power.
Moreover, ti,j captures the sum transmit power of node i via
(27a) and (27d). In (27b), pminj is the minimum radio-link
power of a transmitter in transmit mode. (27c) represents the
minimum-SNR condition for signal reception. Finally, (27e)
can restrict the number of PNs that a CN can choose if the
system designer sets such a restriction.
C. Scenario 2: Minimum-cost data dissemination
Despite the complexity of the SV in (22), we will show that
it can be represented by a piece-wise linear function.
Lemma 2: cSVj,i (a) in (22) can be written as
cSVj,i (a) =
pctj
Mj
+
i∑
n=1
preqn,j − preqn−1,j
Mj + 1− n . (28)
Proof: Using (11), the sum transmit power of a PN j is
composed of two parts; pctj as the fixed circuitry power and
the the radio link power, i.e., pTxj . Since these two parts are
independent and since the SV satisfies the additivity axiom [3,
Ch. 12], the cost of a node i ∈Mj can be separated as
cSVj,i (a) = c
SV
j,i (p
ct
j +p
rcv
j ) = c
SV
j,i (p
ct
j )+c
SV
j,i (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) (29)
in which the cost related to the circutiry power is equally
shared among the CNs as cSVj,i (p
ct
j ) = p
ct
j /Mj [5]. Moreover,
the cost share regarding the requests of the CNs by assuming
that they can be sorted as
0 = preq0,j ≤ preq1,j ≤ · · · ≤ preqn,j ≤ preqi,j ≤ preqn+2,j ≤ · · · ≤ preqMj ,j
(30)
is given by [19] [20]
cSVj,i (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) =
i∑
k=1
preqk,j − preqk−1,j
Mj + 1− k . (31)
Lemma 3: Suppose that the requests received by PN j can
be sorted as (30). cSVj,i (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) in (29) can be modeled by
a piecewise-linear, increasing function as
cSVi,j (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) =
preqi,j
Mj − n +
n≥1∑
k=1
(
−preqk,j
(Mj − k)(Mj − k + 1)
)
.
(32)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 2: Let Mj\i := Mj\{i} be the set of CNs of
PN j without node i with the number Mj\i of CNs. Let p
req
i,j
be the (n + 1)-th smallest request among the CNs of PN j
cMCj,i (a) =

pctj + p
req
i,j , if 1j(Mj\{i}) = 0
preqi,j − pTxj (prcv−i,j), if 1j(Mj\{i}) = 1, preqi,j = max
h∈Mj
{preqh,j}
0 if 1j(Mj\{i}) = 1, preqi,j 6= max
h∈Mj
{preqh,j}.
(26)
argmin
preqi ,ti,wi
∑
j∈Ai
wi,jp
cr
i + ti,j , ∀i ∈ P
(27a)
subject to
wi,jp
min
j ≤ preqi,j ≤ wi,jpmaxj , ∀j ∈ Ai
(27b)∑
j∈Wi
preqi,j gi,j
σ2
= γth ∀j ∈ Ai
(27c)
preqi,j − pTxj (prcv−i,j)
+ (1− 1j(Mj\{i}))wi,jpcrj ≤ ti,j
∀j ∈ Ai
(27d)∑
j∈Ai
wi,j ≤Wmax ∀j ∈ Ai
(27e)
preqi,j , ti,j ∈ R, si,j , wi,j ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ Ai
(27f)
as (30). Then, the cost of a node i in (29) if it joins PN j
according to the SV is obtained by
cSVj,i (a) = mi(n)p
req
i,j + yi(n,p
rcv
−i,j) (33)
in which
mi(n) =
1
Mj\i + 1− n (34)
and
yi(n,p
rcv
−i,j) =
pctj
Mj\i + 1
+
n≥1∑
k=1
(
−preqk,j
(Mj\i − k + 1)(Mj\i − k + 2)
)
.
(35)
Proof: It follows from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
Corollary 1: The optimum request vector of node i, i.e.,
preqi can be obtained by solving an MILP.
The optimal decision of node i can be obtained by the MILP
shown in (36). Notice that the parameters used in the MILP
of (36) are like the ones used for the MC scheme in (27).
V. MRC-BASED CENTRALIZED APPROACH WITH MILP
In the previous section, we discussed decision-making with
the MC and the SV schemes. In this section, we find the
global optimum for both the network power and the social
cost minimization problems.
Theorem 3: Let { ∗ai}PTxi∈P and {
∗
ai}SCi∈P be the set of opti-
mum action profiles corresponding to the network’s minimum
transmit power (see Table I) and the minimum social cost
(with a budget-balanced cost sharing scheme), respectively.
We always have { ∗ai}PTxi∈P = {
∗
ai}SCi∈P .
argmin
preqi ,ti,si,wi
∑
j∈Ai
ti,j , ∀i ∈ P
(36a)
subject to:
wi,jp
min
j ≤ preqi,j ≤ wi,jpmaxj , ∀j ∈ Ai
(36b)∑
j∈Wi
preqi,j gi,j
σ2
= γth ∀j ∈ Ai
(36c)
mi(n)p
req
i,j + yi(n,p
rcv
−i,j) ≤ ti,j
∀j ∈ Ai,
0 ≤ n ≤Mj
(36d)∑
j∈Ai
wi,j ≤Wmax ∀j ∈ Ai
(36e)
preqi,j , ti,j ∈ R, si,j , wi,j ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ Ai
(36f)
Proof: Theorem 3 states that any action profile that
minimizes the network’s transmit power, minimizes the social
cost as well. Using the definition of a budget-balanced cost
sharing scheme, for every PN j ∈ N we have∑
i∈Mj
cBBj,i (a) = P
Tx
j (a). (37)
By taking a summation over all the nodes of the network which
can act as PNs, we get∑
j∈Q
∑
i∈Mj
cBBj,i (a) =
∑
j∈Q
PTxj (a). (38)
Note that the payment received by PN is equal to the cost
paid by its CNs. Therefore, we can replace the left side of
(38), which is the total payment received by the PNs in the
network, with the total cost paid by the CNs. Hence, the left
side of (38), using (16), is equivalent to∑
j∈Q
∑
i∈Mj
cBBj,i (a) =
∑
i∈P
∑
j∈Wi
cBBj,i (a)
=
∑
i∈P
Ci(a) = SC(a) (39)
By comparing (38) and (39), we find that with a budget-
balanced cost sharing scheme, the action profile that minimizes
the social cost also minimizes the network transmit power.
Corollary 2: The MILP that finds the optimum configura-
tion for P1 in (19) can also be used for P2 in (20) if pcrj = 0.
Before providing the MILP, we define the following.
• S˜: The maximum number of time-slots used for message
dissemination in the network. To avoid notational confu-
sion, between the source and the time-slot, we show the
source node in this formulation by S and (s) represents
time-slot s such that 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜.
• PTx (radio-link power matrix): A (N + 1) × S˜ ma-
trix with P = [pTx(1), . . . ,p
Tx
(S˜)
] in which p(s) =
[pTxS,(s), p
Tx
1,(s), . . . , p
Tx
N,(s)]
ᵀ is a column vector and pTxj,(s)
shows the radio-link power of node j in time-slot s.
• T (transmission matrix): A (N + 1) × S˜ binary ma-
trix with T = [tS, t1, . . . , tN ]ᵀ in which tj =
[tj,(1), tj,(2), . . . , tj,(S˜)] is a row vector of size 1× S˜ and
tj,(s) = 1 if node j transmits in time-slot s.
• R (reception matrix): A N × S˜ binary matrix with R =
[r1, . . . , rN ]
ᵀ in which rj = [ri,(1), ri,(2), . . . , ri,(S˜)] is a
row vector of size 1× S˜ and ri,s = 1 if node i receives
the message from a transmitting node that transmits in
time-slot s.
• G (channel gain matrix): A N × (N + 1) matrix with
G := [gᵀ1 , . . . , g
ᵀ
N ]
ᵀ in which gi = [gi,S, gi,1 . . . , gi,N ]
is a 1 × N + 1 row vector and gi,j is the channel gain
between transmitter j and receiver i. We set gi,j = 0 if
j /∈ Ai.
• Γ (SNR matrix): A N × S˜ matrix with Γ :=
[γ1, . . . ,γN ]
ᵀ in which γi = [γi,S, γi,1 . . . , γi,N ] is a
1× S˜ row vector and γi,(s) is the SNR received by node
i in time-slot s.
• 1N : An all 1 vector of size N × 1.
• IN(i): A binary vector of size N×1 with all its elements
equal to 1 except the i-th element.
Before presenting the optimization problem, we provide the
following lemma.
Lemma 4: (Big M method): Let v1, v2 ∈ R≥0 and b ∈
{0, 1} all be the variables of an optimization problem. The
following non-linear constraint
v1 = v2b (40)
can be linearized by the following set of constraints
v1 ≤ v2 (41)
v1 ≤Mb (42)
v1 ≥ v2 −M(1− b) (43)
v1 ≥ 0 (44)
in which M is a sufficiently large number such that v2 ≤M.
Remark 4: According to Lemma 4, when b = 1, based on
the constraints (41) and (43), v2 limits v1 from both upper
and lower sides as v2 ≤ v1 ≤ v2. Hence, v1 = v2 if b = 1.
Likewise, one can observe that when b = 0, according to
(42) and (43) we have v2 −M ≤ v1 ≤ 0. Further, based on
the constraint (44) together with (42) and (43) we finally get
0 ≤ v1 ≤ 0 which results in v1 = 0.
The MILP for the MRC-based multi-hop broadcast is pre-
sented in (45). Recall that, when the network objective is social
cost minimization, we set pcrj = 0 in formulation (45a).
The constraint in (45b) indicates the radio-link power con-
straint. Based on our assumption, every node can transmit
in one time-slot. This property has been captured by (45c).
The condition in (45e) indicates that there exists at most one
transmission per time-slot. Further, every node receives the
message at least in one time slot as shown in (45d). The
constraint in (45f) is due to the fact that a reception occurs in
a time-slot if there is at least one transmission. The constraint
(45g) indicates that a node i ∈ P does not receive the message
if it has already transmitted it. In fact, ri,(s) = 0 if node i
transmits the messages in one of the previous slots 1 ≤ s′ ≤ s.
The expression in (45h), in which  shows the element-wise
product, calculates the normalized SNR of the signal received
at user i in time-slot s. More precisely, given the radio-
link powers of the users at time-slot s in ps, the expression
psIN+1(i)gᵀi gives a vector whose elements are the SNR
of the signal received by node i from each of the transmitters
j ∈ Q in time-slot s. Recall that IN+1(i) is an all-one column
vector of length N + 1 with the i-th element equal to zero.
This helps us to eliminate the SNR received by node i due
to its own transmission. In (45h), 1ᵀN+1
[
p(s)  IN+1(i)  gᵀi
]
gives the SNR received by node i which we normalize it to
γthσ2 and represent it by γˆi,(s) with γˆi,(s) ≤ 1.
Although (45h) determines the SNR available at node i in
time-slot s, the actual SNR received by node i depends on
whether node i receives the message in this time-slot. Node
i uses the signals transmitted in time-slot s if ri,(s) = 1. The
constraints in (45i), (45j) and (45k) are used based on the big
M method, discussed in Lemma 4. They have been employed
here to find out if node i should receive the message in time-
slot s. More precisely, they linearize the following constraint
γi,(s) = ri,(s)γˆi,(s) (46)
in which γˆi,(s) is a function of the continuous variable pTxi,(s)
that makes the right side of (46) non-linear. The constraint
in (45l) indicates that the aggregated SNR obtained by every
node i ∈ P must be higher than the minimum SNR. Every
node i ∈ P can transmit the message in time-slot s if and
only if it receives the message with minimum SNR over the
previous time-slots. The only exception is the source for which
we always have tS,1 = 1.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Simulation setup
An area of size 250m×250m is considered in which the
nodes are randomly distributed. The simulation results are
based on the Monte-Carlo method and in each simulation run,
one of the nodes in the network is randomly chosen as the
source. The total number of nodes varies between 10 and 25.
We assume that the transmit and receive circuitry powers of
the nodes in the network are equal, i.e., pcrj = p
ct
j = p
c
[23] and consider three values for circuitry powers, pc ∈
{1, 10, 100} mW. The low circuitry power case is suitable for
low-power IoT applications while the high circuitry power can
model conventional wireless transmitters [21], [22].
The channel is based on the path-loss model. Let li,j and l0
be the distance between nodes i and j and a reference distance,
respectively. Then, by considering α as the path loss exponent
and λ as the signal wavelength, the power gain of the channel
min
P ,T ,R,Γ
S˜∑
s=1
(∑
j∈Q
pTxj,(s) + p
ct
j tj,(s) +
∑
i∈P
pcrj ri,(s)
)
, (45a)
s. t.:
tj,(s)p
min
j ≤ pTxj,(s) ≤ tj,(s)pmaxj , ∀j ∈ Q, 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (45b)
tj1S˜ ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ Q (45c)
ri1S˜ ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ P (45d)∑
j∈Q
tj,(s) ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ Q, 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (45e)
ri,(s) ≤
∑
j∈Q
tj,(s), ∀i ∈ P, j ∈ Q, 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (45f)
ri,(s) ≤ 1−
s∑
s′=1
ti,(s′), ∀j ∈ Q, 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (45g)
γˆi,(s) = 1
ᵀ
N+1
[
p(s)  IN+1(i)  gᵀi
]
/γthσ2, ∀j ∈ Q, 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (45h)
γi,(s) ≤ γˆi,(s), ∀i ∈ P, 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (45i)
γi,(s) ≥ γˆi,(s) −M(1− ri,(s)), ∀i ∈ P, 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (45j)
γi,(s) ≤Mri,(s), ∀i ∈ P, 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (45k)
γi1S˜ ≥ 1, ∀j ∈ P (45l)
tj,(s) ≤
s−1∑
s′=1
γj,(s′), ∀j ∈ P, 2 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (45m)
tS,1 = 1 (45n)
pTxj,(s), γi,(s) ∈ R≥0, tj,(s), ri,(s) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ P, j ∈ Q, 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (45o)
between nodes i and j is defined as
gi,j =
(
λ
4pil0
)2(
l0
li,j
)α
. (47)
For simulation, we set λ = 0.125m, l0 = 1m and α = 3.
The results are normalized to the value v = p˜Tx + p˜c in
which p˜Tx and p˜c represent normalization reference values
for the radio-link power and the circuitry power, respectively.
More precisely, the normalized network power and the nor-
malized social cost are defined as
P totnet(a) =
∑
j∈Q P
tot
j (a)
v
, SC(a) =
∑
i∈P Ci(a)
v
, (48)
respectively, where P¯ totnet(a) is defined in (14) and Ci(a) =∑
j∈Wi c
SV
j,i in which c
SV
j,i is defined in (28). We set p˜
Tx = 200
mW and p˜c = 10 mW. Moreover, we do not set any limitation
on the number of PNs that a CN is allowed to select. The
simulation has been carried out in MATLAB and the proposed
MILPs are solved using CVX and Gurobi.
The algorithms that we consider in this section for evalua-
tion are as follows.
• GreedyMRC: The centralized MRC-based greedy algo-
rithm proposed in [7] introduced in Section II. Despite
being centralized, due to lack of a more relevant work,
we use it as our main benchmark.
• MC-MRC, SV-MRC: Our proposed MRC-based algo-
rithm with the MC and the SV schemes, respectively.
• MC-OPN, SV-OPN: Special case of MC-MRC and SV-
MRC in which the nodes can choose only one PN.
• MILP-MRC, MILP-OPN: The MILP-based optimum
solution obtained by solving (45) with and without ex-
ploiting MRC, respectively.
B. Simulation results
We first show the importance of taking the circuitry power
into account for message dissemination. We compare our
proposed algorithm with GreedyMRC proposed in [7] which is
centralized, ignores the circuitry power required at the nodes
and merely considers the power required for the radio link
in network optimization. Figures 3a, 3b and 3c, correspond to
low, medium and high circuitry powers, respectively. First, we
observe that by increasing the number N of nodes, the network
power increases. This is because the circuitry powers required
at the nodes for message reception and transmission impose
additional power on the network which is not negligible.
Second, we observe in Fig. 3a that by increasing the number
of nodes, the powers required by both algorithms tend to
saturate. When the network becomes denser, the number of
PNs required for covering the network and serving all the
receiving nodes does not necessarily increase. Hence, by
increasing the number of nodes, at some point, the total radio
link power required in the network for message dissemination
remains unchanged. However, the circuitry power required at
the nodes makes the network power continue to increase. The
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Fig. 3: Network power for different numbers N of nodes in the network and different values pc of circuitry power.
value of the circuitry power in Fig. 3c is higher than that for
the other two cases. Thus, in Fig. 3c, even if the total radio-link
power of the network does not change significantly, the high
value of the circuitry power dominates the radio-link power
required in the network. This results in a constant increase of
the network power in Fig. 3c.
Our proposed algorithm outperforms GreedyMRC in all the
three cases shown in Fig. 3. When the circuitry power of the
nodes is high, the performance of our game-theoretic algorithm
becomes significantly better than the benchmark algorithm, see
Fig. 3c. The main reason is that with our approach the nodes
take the circuitry power into account in choosing their PNs. In
contrast, with [7], the message is always transmitted over large
number of hops in order to minimize the total radio link power
of the network. Since each transmission requires circuitry
power besides the radio-link power, the actual network power
required by [7] for message dissemination, after adding the
circuitry power of the nodes to the outcome of the algorithm,
becomes significantly high. This is more pronounced with high
values of the circuitry power.
In Fig. 4 we evaluate the effect of employing the MRC in
message dissemination. We depict the network power obtained
via the MC and the MILP approaches for different numbers
of the nodes and different values of the circuitry power. First,
we observe that with MRC, the message can be disseminated
with a lower network power compared to the case of one PN
(OPN). Second, we find in Fig. 4a that, when the circuitry
power is low (pc = 1 mW), employing the MRC technique
results in a higher gain compared to the case in which the
circuitry power is high. In fact, when the radio-link power
dominates the circuitry power, it is beneficial for the nodes to
combine the signals from multiple PNs. Conversely in Fig. 4b,
where the circuitry power is high, i.e., 100 mW, the nodes do
not exploit the MRC as it requires reception circuitry power
over multiple time-slots. In other words, as shown in Fig. 4b,
even if the nodes are allowed to choose multiple PNs, they
only select one PN and hence, the performance of the MPN
and OPN approaches are almost the same.
Figure 5 evaluates the effect of employing MRC on the
social cost. As mentioned earlier, when the social cost mini-
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Fig. 4: The normalized network power for different numbers N of
nodes in the network and different values pc of circuitry power.
mization is the objective, the nodes do not consider their own
reception circuitry power. In fact, the goal of the nodes in this
case is to minimize the power imposed on their chosen PNs
and consequently to minimize the cost they pay. Similar to
the MC-based game in Fig. 4, here, SV-MRC performs better
that SV-OPN in terms of the social cost. In other words, the
total cost paid by the receiving nodes in order to receive the
message reduces when they are allowed to receive the message
from more than one PN. By comparing Fig. 4a and Fig. 5a,
we find that employing the MRC has a slightly higher gain
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Fig. 5: The normalized social cost for different numbers N of nodes
and different values pc of circuitry power.
on the SV-based game than the MC-based game. The reason
is that in the SV-based game, the reception circuitry power is
not considered in the cost function of a CN. Hence, receiving
via the MRC over multiple time-slots imposes a lower cost
on the receiving nodes compared to the MC-based game in
which the cost of reception is also included.
In order to find the effect of the MRC technique on nodes’
decision, in Fig. 6 we show the average number of PNs per
CN with two values for the circuitry power, 1 mW and 10 mW.
Considering the MC-MRC and the SV-MRC for low circuitry
power, i.e., pc = 1 mW, we observe that the average number
of PNs per CN for the MC-based game is higher than that for
the SV-based game. The reason is that, since the objective is
network power minimization and since the circuitry power in
this case is low, the nodes exploit the MRC technique to a
higher extent than the SV-based game in order to reduce their
costs as well as the network power.
In addition, we observe that, in general, when the circuitry
power increases, the average number of PNs per CN reduces
for both the MC-based and the SV-based games. This reduc-
tion is more significant for the MC-based game. Recall that,
with the MC-based game, the cost of a CN with respect to the
circuitry power of its PN is either zero (in multicast) or pc
(in unicast), see (26). Moreover, according to (28), with the
SV-based game, the circuitry power of transmission at the PN
is equally shared among the CNs. In short, the impact of the
transmission circuitry power on the cost function of a node is
not as significant as the impact of the reception circuitry power
which is only captured in the MC-based game. Therefore, as
the circuitry power increases from pc = 1 mW to pc = 10
mW, the nodes in the MC-based game react by choosing a
lower number of PNs, while in contrast, such an increase of
the circuitry power has a lower impact on the decision of the
nodes in the SV-based game. For instance, when there are 20
nodes in the network, by increasing the circuitry power from
pc = 1 mW to pc = 10 mW, the average number of PN per
CN with the MC-based game reduces from 1.26 to 1.11 PNs
per CN. These numbers for the SV-based game are 1.18 and
10 15 20 25
1.1
1.2
1.3
No. N of Nodes
A
vg
.n
o.
of
PN
s
pe
r
C
N
SV - pc = 1 mW
SV - pc = 10 mW
MC - pc = 1 mW
MC - pc = 10 mW
Fig. 6: The average number of PNs per CN for different numbers N
of nodes in the network.
4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Fig. 7: Normalized network power P totnet(a) versus the number S˜ of
time-slots used for message dissemination.
1.16 PNs per CN, respectively.
Finally, Fig. 7 shows how efficient the resources are used
in this network for different algorithms. We plot the network
power versus the number of time-slots used in the network for
message dissemination. The optimum MILP-based approach
and the MC-based game are considered with two different
values of circuitry power, that is, pc = 10 mW and pc =
100 mW. Further, the performance of the GreedyMRC is also
shown for the case of pc = 10 mW. Since the network power
obtained by the GreedyMRC for pc = 100 mW is much higher
than for the other algorithms, we omit the GreedyMRC for
pc = 100 mW. In Fig. 7, the closer the points are to the
origin, the better the resources are used. As can be seen,
when the circuitry power increases, the number of time-slots
required for message dissemination in the network decreases.
In other words, transmissions over a large number of hops
impose additional transmission and reception circuitry powers
on the nodes. Hence, cost minimization at the nodes results
in a message dissemination strategy that requires a lower
number of time-slots. Considering both Fig. 7 and Fig. 6, it can
be inferred that by increasing the circuitry power, the nodes
tend to receive the message from one PN and the multicast
receiving groups are formed by a larger number of CNs so
that both the average number of PNs per CN as well as the
average number of required time-slots reduce.
VII. SUMMARY
We studied multi-hop broadcast in a network with one
source and multiple receivers. The nodes are able to exploit
the MRC technique and combine the messages received from
multiple transmitting nodes in order to reduce the network
power required for message dissemination. We studied two
scenarios depending on the need for an incentive for the
transmitting nodes. A decentralized approach using a non-
cooperative CSG is proposed in which the nodes employ the
MC and the SV cost sharing schemes for minimization of net-
work power in incentive-independent networks and social cost
in incentive-mandatory networks, respectively. We showed that
our proposed game is a potential game that possesses an
NE. Simulation results showed that our proposed algorithm
outperforms the existing heuristic algorithm concerning the
required power for message dissemination while it is also able
to address the incentive and fairness issues. Further, since our
algorithm captures the impact of the circuitry power on the
network power, the higher the circuitry power of the nodes,
the higher gain is obtained by our algorithm compared to the
benchmarks. We also presented the centralized global optimum
via an MILP that can be used for both scenarios.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Assume that preqi,j is the (n + 1)th lowest request from PN
j as shown in (30) such that preqi,j = p
req
n+1,j . Based on (31) by
considering i = n + 1, cSVj,i (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) can be written as a
function of n as
cSVi,j (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) =
preqi,j − preqn,j
Mj + 1− (n+ 1) +
n∑
k=1
preqk,j − preqk−1,j
Mj + 1− k .
(49)
Expanding the right side of (49) leads to
cSVi,j (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) =
preqi,j
Mj − n −
preqn,j
Mj − n
+
preqn,j
Mj − n+ 1 + · · · −
preq1,j
Mj − 1 +
preq1,j
Mj
. (50)
Eq. (50) is equivalent to
cSVi,j (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) =
preqi,j
Mj − n +
n≥1∑
k=1
(
−preqk,j
(Mj − k)(Mj − k + 1)
)
.
(51)
It can be derived from (51) that the cost of node i is obtained
by a linear function whose slope and y-intercept depend on
the interval that preqi,j falls in. Eq. (51) shows that if p
req
i,j
increases and falls inside an interval with a higher n, the slope
of the function cj,i in (51) increases accordingly. Besides, the
y-intercept of cj,i decreases. Hence, cj,i forms a piece-wise
linear function that increases in the interval [0, pmaxj ].
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